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Abstract— Recent years have seen exponential development in 
wireless sensor devices and their rebirth as IoT, as well as 
increased popularity in wireless home devices such as bulbs, fans, 
and microwave. As they can be used in various fields such as 
medical devices, environmental studies, fire department or 
military application, etc., security of these low powered devices 
will always be a concern for all the user and security experts. Users 
nowadays want to control all these “smart” wireless home devices 
through their smartphones using an internet connection. Attacks 
such as distributed attacks on these devices will render the whole 
system vulnerable as these attacks can record and extract 
confidential information as well as increase resource (energy) 
consumption of the entire network. In this paper, we propose a 
cyber-attack detection algorithm and present an impact analysis 
of easy-to-launch cyber-attacks on a low-power mote (Z1 Zolertia) 
as a model IoT device. We also present detailed results of power 
consumption analysis with and without attack along with when the 
mitigation algorithm for intrusion detection is implemented. 
Keywords— IoT network security, Cyber-attack mitigation, 
intrusion detection system 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) devices provide users several 
advantages including being easy to use, compact and wireless in 
connectivity. These devices comprise of sensors such as 
temperature, humidity, and sound, and are usually part of a 
network allowing it to be controlled through a centralized device 
such as a smartphone or a PC. Zolertia Z1, Sky Mote, and T-
mote are a few examples of wireless sensor network devices of 
the first generation. The newer generation of these devices, most 
commonly known as IoT devices, are packaged as easy to use 
devices for use as smart homes devices. Also, companies such 
Amazon has dash buttons which are equipped with these IoT 
devices [1]. As these devices are compact and provide user to 
control through easily accessible mobile devices, they have a 
wide variety of applications such as health monitoring systems, 
hands-free household device control, and military applications. 
However, according to some studies, 70 percent of these 
devices have many vulnerabilities [2]. We are using Zolertia Z1 
in our experiment as this device works on the same principle as 
the newer generation of IoT devices works. As these devices are 
low-powered and have limited computational capabilities, the 
impact of attacks such as wormhole or flooding will have a 
disastrous effect on the entire network. To prevent these attacks, 
there is a need of a power efficient intrusion detection system 
(IDS). Such an IDS can monitor the whole network constantly 
for malicious activity or violation as a result of an intrusion. IDS 
can either be an additional hardware or an algorithm. If IDS is 
in the form of hardware, then there is a risk of increased power 
consumption within the IoT network. Recently, there has been 
numerous cases of huge DDoS attacks using millions of IoT 
devices [3]. In the specifically cited case, millions of IoT 
devices, packaged with an insecure operating system, were used 
to send requests to a DNS provider called Dyn, leading to 
disruption in services of providers like Netflix, CNN, and 
Twitter [4]. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that manufacturers have not 
been paying much attention to the security of these IoT devices 
while focusing on fast-track development, marketing and 
delivery to the market. This also necessitates the development 
of a secure communication algorithm for IoT devices which can 
be directly used on any of these IoT devices irrespective of their 
manufacturer to protect organizations as well as individuals 
using them for their smart homes. 
A. Contributions 
Considering these limitations and requirements, there is a 
need for an algorithm that will provide security and overcome 
resource limitations. Such a secure message passing technique 
should be designed for these low powered devices along with 
cyber-attack detection. Clearly, implementing various secure 
cryptographic protocols on these devices will increase the 
consumption of resources on these IoT devices. This paper 
proposes a novel algorithm that is employed within Zolertia Z1 
motes to test the efficiency of the algorithm in terms of 
enhancing security and reducing power consumption, as these 
devices work on the same principle as the newer generation of 
IoT devices. After result validation, we can implement the same 
algorithm on other popular IoT devices. 
B. Paper outline 
The next section discusses related work in the domain and 
includes some of the existing implementations. In section III, the 
information about the technology used such as hardware, 
software, and environment selected for the experimental setup 
are discussed. Most importantly brief information about the 
implemented algorithm. Section IV presents various simulation 
and experimental results along with their comparative analysis. 
Finally, we conclude the paper in section V. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In this paper, we are discussing and proposing a novel cyber-
attack mitigation technique for IoT device networks. The 
analysis conducted considers the impact of cyber-attacks and 
deployment of the IDS algorithm on the network comprising of 
IoT devices. In a previous work, a comparative analysis of 
energy consumption and battery life estimation for similar IoT 
devices was presented [5]. Similar experiment pattern is being 
followed in this paper to validate our algorithm. However, in this 
paper, the efficiency of the proposed security algorithm is 
discussed, and a comparison has been presented of the results 
after conducting the same experiment in enclosed lab space with 
and without IDS with an ongoing cyber attack. Most works in 
the area of energy consumption analysis with ongoing attacks 
and implemented IDS use simulation rather than real-world 
motes. However, a study deals with real world experiments with 
a Z1 and Open motes [6]. On the contrary, this work does not 
target security or analyzes the behavior of motes when a security 
algorithm is implemented. There is one security based work, but 
it is also limited in its analysis due to its nature of being 
simulation based [7]. 
As w are considering IoT devices constrained energy 
resources will always be an important aspect. There is an 
investigative study regarding performance measurements [8], 
energy consumption and computation point of view with the 
help of MICAz and TelosB sensors after the implementation of 
Elliptical curve cryptography One more similar study has been 
conducted considering all Mica wireless sensor network devices 
and TelosB sensors [9] but these devices have more computing 
features compared to Zolertia Z1 as it is very low powered 
devices consisting very limited. Also in one of the studies, there 
is a proposed lightweight encryption for IoT devices. [10] As 
these devices have many security issues if they are being used 
in healthcare application systems such as Wireless body area 
network. [11] If the power consumption of these IoT devices is 
considered, then there are many studies but out of them a survey 
of the wireless sensor network power consumption is present, 
but it has been conducted in a simulation environment. [12] 
However, in this paper, the efficiency of the proposed 
security algorithm is discussed, and a comparison has been 
presented of the results after conducting the same experiment in 
enclosed lab space with and without IDS with an ongoing cyber 
attack. Most works in the area of energy consumption analysis 
with ongoing attacks. In the next section, there will be a detailed 
description of our technological approach towards conducting 
the experiments. 
III. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
As we are conducting an impact analysis of cyber-attack 
and cyber-attack mitigation for low-power IoT devices, we are 
using Zolertia Z1 motes as our testing platform. 
A. Hardware 
These devices use the second-generation MSP430, a low 
powered 16-bit MCU operating at 16 MHz. It has the micro-
USB connector for power and debugging. It is also equipped 
with the CC2420 transceiver that operates at 2.4GHz and is 
compliant with IEEE 802.15.4, 6LowPAN, ZigBee protocols. 
It also comprises of other sensors such as 3-Axis gyroscope, 
±2/4/8/16 g digital accelerometer (ADXL345), and digital 
temperature sensor (TMP102) with ± 0.5ºC accuracy [13]. 
These devices work in the range of 0.3-3.6V, and it can even 
operate on two 1.5V AA batteries [5] and code size as these IoT 
devices have limited memory. This OS requires kernel, 
libraries, the program loader and a set of processes and supports 
C programming language. [13] 
B. Environment 
 We are analyzing the impact of cyber-attack and proposed 
IDS by changing different operating conditions such as 
basketball court, auditorium, open parking lot, and working lab 
space as well as in various lighting conditions. During 
simulation, we followed the same topology, i.e., eight motes in 
a grid of 15ft x 5ft and repeated the same procedure except 
changing the operating environment. Cooja simulation platform 
has limited support in terms of simulation in a different 
environment [14].  
C. Experimental Setup 
 For experimental setup, we created testbed of nine motes 
and out of nine, we used eight motes to create a grid of 15ft x 
5ft on which we ran the broadcast and one to one 
communication programs. The ninth mote collected the power 
consumption data using the powertrace code in different 
operating and lighting conditions [5] [15]. This process was 
followed to observe the behavior of network when there is no 
attack. Then we echoed the same procedure by converting one 
of the motes from the grid to the attacker and again the 
congruent methodology by implementing our proposed IDS in 
one of the eight motes. From figure 1, we can observe the 
topology used for real world mote experiments.  To validate the 
results from the real-world mote experiments, we also analyze 
the impact on simulation using Cooja.  
D. Software 
As discussed in the previous section we considered Contiki 
OS for the provision of Zolertia Z1 drivers. Contiki OS is very 
efficient OS for low-powered devices such as Z1 mote, Sky 
mote, etc. For running Contiki OS require kernel, libraries, the 
program loader and the set of processes [15]. This OS supports 
C programming language, and it can run platforms such as 
MSP430 [14] [16]. Contiki OS is capable of implementing any 
topology according. 
 From figure 2, we can compare the protocols followed by 
IoT and regular IP network. In the figure, we can notice that 
after the presentation of the layer representation of the regular 
network stack is there and after that protocols followed by IoT 
devices and implementation of the Contiki layer.  
Figure 1. Topology used for the Z1 motes in real-world experiments 
We followed the same topology as we can observe from 
the figure 3, with which we ran simulation without any 
proposed implementation with the help of nine motes. We can 
observe the topology used in simulation in the figure. On eight 
out of nine motes we ran Broadcast and Unicast and on 
remaining one powertrace example. Then in simulation, also we 
employed our proposed implementation following the same 
pattern.  
E. Attack Mitigation Algorithm 
To mitigate cyber-attacks, an IDS that will monitor the IoT 
network and detect attacks is required. To mitigate the attack 
and secure the network from intrusions, the proposed technique 
combines physical layer parameter based key generation for 
cryptography with packet encapsulation. The algorithm detects 
several types of intrusions as per our experiments with 
wormhole and Sybil attacks.  
The physical layer parameters used for key generation 
include RSSI, location, and other channel parameters. In the 
figure we can observe the architecture we are proposing.  We 
can notice that we are connecting all the nodes to the internet 
with the help of IPv6 protocol and during the implementation, 
we are considering all the key generation, neighboring nodes 
monitoring, RSSI collection and monitoring  and attack 
detection.  
Figure 4 we can notice the general architecture of the 
implemented intrusion detection system. It has one anchor node 
to collect, determine the neighboring node information. This 
architecture follows the following steps:  
a. Determining the distance between each node in the 
network 
b. Collecting the information regarding the neighboring 
node(s) such as the distance of the neighboring nodes 
from the anchor nodes. 
c. If the neighboring in not in the range of the anchor node 
then 
i. Generate alert  
 
Figure 2. Implementation in Regular Network, IoT network and Contiki 
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Fig 3. Topology used in simulation 
 
Figure 4.  Architecture of the Attack mitigation algorithm 
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Algorithm 1 Cyber-attack Mitigation in IoT Devices
Input: Node = N to n, Distance = di, Range = D, Vn 
= Victim Node 
Output: Vn, An = attacker node 
1: for i = 1 to n do 
2: for j = 1 to n except i do 
3: Calculate dij = distance (Ni, Nj) 
4: D = distance through RSSI monitoring;
5: if D>di then 
6: Attacker Flag=1  
7: set Vn = Ni 
8: Go to step 1 
9: else 
10: Attacker Flag = 0; 
11: continue 
12: end if 
13: end for
 14: end for    
ii. If corrupted node is 6BR then, monitoring of the whole 
IPv6 stack initiated 
d. RSSI monitoring is initiated  
e. Determine the RSSI values  
f. Determining the nodes that are in the range considering 
the error while determining RSSI values. 
g. Node which not in range while considering the errors in 
RSSI values considered as suspected node 
h. Again, running the algorithm to check the probability of 
being that is suspected node 
i. Higher the probability, higher the chances of being 
attacker node. 
j. Then, suspected node is declared as Attacker node. 
While detecting the attacker node, we can even track the 
node location as this algorithm is based on node localization. 
Following the algorithm implemented. As we can see that we 
have to follow every other step mentioned above.   
 The implemented algorithm is modified version of the 
existing IDS which was designed for wormhole attack 
considering the low powered devices or IoT devices such as 
Zolertia Z1. As we are analyzing the impact of implementation 
of intrusion detection system as these implementations should 
be efficient considering resource consumption. After the 
implementation, this algorithm is successful in detecting the 
cyber-attack, but we should also be concerned about the energy 
consumption of these devices and their battery life estimation. 
Therefore in next section, we are focusing on the impact 
analysis of the proposed algorithm by conducting many 
experiments by varying the operating environment such as 
working lab space and open parking lot. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we are presenting the results of our impact 
analysis after the implementation of the algorithm.  
As our most important aspect is to provide security for 
these devices but as we are working with such low powered 
devices, their impact analysis is also one of the most important 
things that we have to consider. We are conducting an 
experiment and presenting the results regarding the impact on 
these devices after the implementation of cyber-attack 
mitigation algorithm in terms of resource or energy 
consumption. The procured parameters from the powertrace 
example we run are in the form of CPU, LPM, Tx and Rx time.  
Through powertrace code, we can evaluate the efficiency 
of the algorithm based on the accurate data regarding the power 
consumption of the whole network. To calculate the energy 
consumption in millijoules, we used the following standard 
equation [7] from literature, considering the parameter from 
Table 3. 
ܧ݊݁ݎ݃ݕሺ݉ܬ)
= ܥܷܲ ∗ 0.5 + ܮܲܯ ∗ 0.0005 + ܶݔ ∗ 17.4 + ܴݔ ∗ 18.8) ∗ 332768  
 
Table 3. Operating States of Zolertia Z1 [13] 
Operating States Ratings Unit 
MCU on 18.8 mA 
MCU on 17.4 mA 
MCU idle 0.1 μA 
MCU standby 0.5 μA 
Voltage 3.6 V 
 
Figure 5. Energy Consumption during broadcasting in Simulation and 
working lab space 
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Figure 6. Energy Consumption During One to One communication in 
Simulation and lab space 
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Where,  
CPU = Time for which mote was active,  
LPM = Total time for which the mote was in low power mode,  
Tx = Total transmission time,  
Rx = Total listening time. 
In the topology we have used, the central node acts as an 
attacker node. The results of proposed algorithm were also 
compared with other existing algorithms to prove its power-
efficiency. As an example, the power consumption analysis of 
our IDS indicates that although the real-world power 
consumption is quite high compared to simulation results, the 
algorithm results in lesser power consumption when compared 
with the system under attack. In figure 5, we can compare the 
energy consumption with and without attack, in simulation and 
on real world motes and with implemented IDS. We considered 
working lab space as an environment to conduct experiment 
primarily.  We can clearly observe that   Energy consumption 
increases significantly as the number of nodes is increasing. 
With IDS implemented there no significant increase in energy 
consumption.  
In figure 6, we can again compare the energy consumption 
during one-to-one communication in simulation and lab space. 
The results are congruent to the one we have in figure 6. 
Interference present in the environment can also contribute to 
these changes in energy consumption. In both of these, we ran 
broadcasting example as we change the operating environment 
for both of that experiment. We can observe that from readings 
we accumulated in lab space and parking lot there is a 
noticeable difference in both those operating environment as 
there is much interference in parking lot compared to lab space. 
Also, we can notice that there is also a surge in resource 
consumption because of implementation along with 
interference present.  
 We can observe that from readings we accumulated in lab 
space and parking lot there is a noticeable difference in both 
those operating environment as there is much interference in 
parking lot compared to lab space. Also, we can notice that 
there is also a surge in resource consumption because of 
implementation along with interference present. 
 
Figure 7. Energy Consumption during broadcasting in open parking lot 
and simulation 
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Figure 8. Energy Consumption during one-to-one communication in 
parking lot and simulation 
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Figure 9. Energy Consumption during different operating conditions 
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In figure 7 and 8, we can observe the results we accumulated 
from the conducted experiment considering open parking lot as 
an environment instead of working lab space. Similar to 
previous results the presented in these figures also consists of 
the effects of present interference. As for this experiment, we 
chose one to one communication example or Unicast example 
for communication. As for the one to one communication, we 
required lot of resource consumption contrary to our simulation 
results for the same example which we have noticed from our 
previously conducted experiments also [5] 
As our previous study shows that interference present in 
the environment because of electrical interference, magnetic 
interference, etc., energy consumption increases significantly 
[5]. On the basis of the readings we got from the conducted 
experiments we can predict the battery life (T) of the devices 
by using the following equation: 
ܧ =෍ܸ݅ ∗ ܫ݅ ∗ ܶ݅
௡
௜ୀ଴
 
Where, E= energy in joules, I = current drawn, T = Time, V = 
Voltage, n is the number of overall readings. 
With the help of this equation, we trace the battery 
consumption and can also predict the battery life. This equation 
[5] also give us detailed insight into the impact of the 
implementation on these devices.  
In figure 9. We can get the exact idea about the battery life 
estimation of the nodes after the implementation of IDS on 
those nodes considering different environments such as 
working lab space and parking lot. As with the help of all the 
parameter measurements we got from all of the conducted 
experiments, we can estimate the battery life with the 
implementation of intrusion detection system. From the 
referenced figure, we can observe the estimation of battery life 
for lab space and open parking lot. In general, during 
broadcasting example with implemented IDS battery life is 
more compared to one to one communication. As from our 
conducted experiment we have concluded while IDS was 
already in place, consumption requirement for broadcasting in 
real world mote is less as compared to one to one 
communication. This can be clearly observed this significant 
difference in power consumption for these scenarios from 
figure 9. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Considering the prevalence of these IoT devices, before we 
can employ these devices for a critical application, security 
aspects need to be addressed. More research in the area of IoT 
device security is needed to make IoT network efficient and 
secure. Therefore, an efficient and secure IDS was proposed in 
this paper for securing individual IoT devices. This algorith 
uses very low power, as seen from the results, and enhances 
security by detecting and thwarting cyber-attacks. The real-
world experiments using Z1 Zolertia motes (first generation IoT 
devices) indicated the efficacy of proposed technique in 
different environments. As a limitation, it should be noticed that 
the algorithm might not work against all types of attacks. 
Therefore, generalization for thwarting more types of attacks 
could be a possible future work. 
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